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ABSTRACT 
Previous research on the impact of  chief executive officer (CEO) locus of  control 
is  mainly based on simple and partial mappings of bivariate associations between 
CEO  locus  of  control  and  organizational  outcomes.  In  addition,  distinct 
substreams have  emerged  in  which  intricately  related  phenomena  are  studied 
separately. To  overcome  this  fragmentation  and  polarization,  we  provide  and 
empirically test  an integrative framework based  on previously tested  hypotheses 
on  the  impact  of  CEO locus  of  control.  Our  approach  differs  from  prior 
research  in  two  ways.  First, it  simultaneously takes  account of  strategic choice 
and firm  performance in  order to  assess the  extent to  which  strategy mediates 
the relationship between CEO locus of  control and organizational performance. 
Second, we  consider  the  CEO to  be  both  a  formulator and  implementor of 
organizational  strategies. Besides  the  observation  that  CEO  locus  of  control 
seems to  matter a lot in  terms of  explaining organizational performance in  the 
present sample, our  results  demonstrate that  an  integrative approach increases 
our  insight  into  the  impact  of  CEO locus  of  control by  revealing why  some 
CEOs achieve higher organizational performance than others. 
INTRODUCTION 
Research  into  the  effect  of  characteristics of  top  managers  on  organizational 
outcomes has  recently attracted the  attention of  many scholars, especially after 
the  publication of  two  seminal  articles  in  the  ‘strategic leadership’ domain by 
Hambrick  apd  Mason  (1984) and  by  Gupta  (1984). The  strategic leadership 
domain 
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[flocuses on the people who have overall responsibility for an organization - 
the  characteristics of  those people,  what  they  do, and how  they  do it.  The 
people who are the  subjects of strategic leadership research can be individual 
executives  (e.g. chief  executive officers or  division  general  managers),  more 
broadly  defined  ‘top management  teams’,  or other  governance  bodies  (e.g. 
board of directors). (Hambrick, 1989, p. 6) 
The ultimate aim of  these studies is  to explore whether and why  chief executive 
officers (CEOs) and/or top management teams make a difference. In this paper 
we  will focus on the CEO. 
In our view,  current research in  the  strategic leadership  domain suffers from 
two limitations. The first consists of the almost exclusive attention to the effect of 
‘observable’ characteristics of  CEOs on strategy and performance - such as age 
(Norburn, 1986), functional career track (Chaganti and Sambharya, 1987; Gupta 
and Govindarajan,  1984; Michel and Hambrick,  1992; Reed  and Reed,  1989; 
Song,  1982), tenure  (Finkelstein and  Hambrick,  1990; Miller,  199  1;  Norburn, 
1986), and  combinations  of  demographic  characteristics  (Bantel  and Jackson, 
1989; Thomas et al.,  1991; Wiersema and Bantel,  1992) - while neglecting the 
possible impact of personality characteristics of top managers. Such an approach 
impedes gaining full insight into the reason why certain top managers are more 
successful  than  others.  Hambrick  and  Mason  (1984,  p. 196)  argue  that 
‘[dlemographic  indicators  may  contain  more  noise  than  purer  psychological 
measures.  For  example  a  person’s  educational  background  may  serve  as  a 
muddied indicator of  socioeconomic background, motivation, cognitive style, risk 
propensity, and other underlying traits’. In line with  this reasoning we  chose to 
study  the  influence of  a  fundamental  personality  characteristic - i.e.  locus  of 
control (e.g. Miller and Toulouse, 1986a, b; Miller et al.,  1982). 
Rotter (1966) and his colleagues developed the locus of control construct from 
the  former’s  (1954) social  learning  theory.  The construct  refers  to  individual 
differences in a generalized belief in internal versus external control of reinforce- 
ments (Rotter, 1966). Those with an external locus of control see themselves as 
relatively passive  agents  and  believe  that  the  events  in  their  lives  are  due  to 
uncontrollable  forces.  Externals  feel  that  the  things  they  want  to  achieve  are 
dependent  on  luck,  chance  and powerful persons  or institutions. They believe 
that the probability of being able to control their lives by their own actions and 
efforts is  low.  Conversely, those with  an internal locus of control see themselves 
as  active  agents,  feel  that  they  are  masters  of  their  fates  and trust  in  their 
capacity to influence the environment. Internals assume that they can control the 
events in their lives by effort and skill. 
The ‘face validity’ of this construct for studying the influence of CEOs follows 
directly  from  its  definition,  as  leading  a  company  is  in  essence  a  persistent 
attempt  to  control  the  environment.  In  view  of  the  fact  that  psychologists 
believing in  situational determinism doubt that personality traits do exist at all 
(for  a  discussion  see  Epstein,  1979,  1980; Mischel,  1984), it  is  important  to 
mention  that  recent  research  indicates  that  locus  of  control  is  a &ndamental 
personality trait. First,  Miller  and Rose  (1982) and Pedersen  et al.  (1989) have 
shown that locus of control is  to a certain extent inherited. Second, psychophy- 
siological findings suggest that  locus  of  control is associated with  differences in 
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cerebral functioning (De Brabander et al., 1992). In effect, internals rely more on 
the  functions of  the  left  hemisphere for sensory-motor control while  executing 
laboratory tasks than externals. This conclusion is deduced from indications of  a 
relatively higher activation of  the left hemisphere among internals. 
The second limitation, also pertaining to  the  scarce pieces  of  CEO locus of 
control research,  is  the  absence  of  a  coherent framework  to  study  ‘executive 
leadership’ (Hambrick, 1989; Thomas et al.,  1991). The reason is  that distinct 
substreams  emerged  in  which  intricately  related  phenomena  are  studied 
separately. First, several authors focus solely on the relationship between manage- 
rial characteristics and strategic choice (Bantel and Jackson,  1989; Chaganti and 
Sambharya, 1987; Miller et al.,  1982; Song,  1982), whereas others explore the 
association between these characteristics and organizational performance (Begley 
and Boyd,  1987; Brockhaus,  1980; Norburn,  1986). In our view,  an  approach 
incorporating both  strategy  and  performance  simultaneously will  increase  our 
insight  into  the  broader  phenomenon  of  executive  influence  (Thomas  et  al., 
1991).”] A second polarization relates to the issue of the CEO as a strategy formu- 
lator or a strategy implementor (Gupta, 1988; Nahavandi and Malekzadeh, 1993; 
Thomas et al.,  1991). The former approach investigates the main effects of CEO 
characteristics on  strategy  and,  occasionally, performance.  Thus,  the  CEO is 
viewed as the architect of  the organization’s strategic orientation (Hambrick and 
Mason, 1984). The latter approach focuses on the concept of match, arguing that 
managerial  characteristics should  be  aligned  to  a  given  strategy  in  order  to 
achieve  high  organizational performance (Gupta,  1984,  1988; Nahavandi  and 
Malekzadeh,  1993).  Hence,  the  leader  moderates  the  relationship  between 
strategy and performance. The implicit assumption is  that  strategies are given, 
and that the main task of CEOs therefore is  to implement rather than formulate 
strategies (Gupta, 1988). We,  however, agree with  Nahavandi and Malekzadeh 
(1 993, p. 4 1 1) that ‘[w] hen one is concerned with the upper echelon of the organi- 
zation, one needs to focus on individuals who, in most instances, are the ones who 
have the charge of both the formulation and the implementation of the strategy of 
the organization. . . .  the leader can be both a main effect and a moderator.’ 
In this  paper, we  basically aim at replicating previously tested hypotheses on 
the impact of  CEO locus of  control on organizational outcomes. To overcome 
the  fragmentation and polarization described above, however, we  start from an 
integrative framework that synthesizes existing CEO locus of control research. In 
this respect, our approach differs from previous studies in two ways.  First, the 
framework simultaneously takes account of strategic choice and firm performance 
in order to assess the extent to which strategy mediates the relationship between 
CEO locus of  control and organizational-performance.  Second, we  assume that 
CEOs are both  formulators and implementors of  organizational strategies. For 
reasons explained in  the methods section, we  focus on CEOs of small firms in 
one  homogeneous  fragmented industry - the  Flemish  furniture industry.  The 
analysis  of  the  integrative  model  reveals  that:  (1)  our  data  fit  the  scattered 
findings of previous studies remarkably well;  (2) such an approach increases our 
insight into the impact of CEO locus of control by disentangling the reasons why 
internal CEOs achieve higher organizational performance than external CEOs; 
and (3) existing models of  CEO locus of  control are too simple to describe the 
complex phenomenon of ‘executive leadership’. 
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A final remark relates to the article of Boone and Van Witteloostuijn (1996), in 
which we  reported preliminary results on the relationship between CEO locus of 
control  and firm  performance  in  the  Flemish  furniture industry  for .illustrative 
purposes. The present paper  moves  far beyond  Boone  and Van  Witteloostuijn 
(1996) because (i) we  explicitly develop and test an integrative framework, (ii) we 
emphasize in depth the intermediary role of strategy choice and the CEO’s role 
of formulator and implementor, and (iii) we incorporate alternative determinants 
of  small  firm  performance,  such  as  CEO tenure  and  organizational  slack,  as 
covariates. 
The paper  is  organized  as  follows. The next  section presents  an integrative 
framework and elaborates several hypotheses. We  then  report  on the  methods 
used to analyse the integrative model, followed by the empirical results. The last 
section is a discussion. 
PREVIOUS RESEARCH AND AN INTEGRATIVE RESEARCH MODEL 
A Model 
Previous research relating CEO locus of control to organizational performance is 
relatively scarce. However,  the  findings of  these  studies consistently  show that 
firms led by internal CEOs perform better than firms headed by external CEOs. 
For one, Miller and Toulouse (1986a, b; in both articles the results are based on 
the  same  heterogeneous  sample  of  small  firms) collected  five  different  perfor- 
mance indices. Their data suggest that the  CEO’s internal control  expectancies 
are associated with successful firm performance, especially in firms operating in a 
dynamic environment.  In dynamic environments,  there  is  ‘[mlore  need  for  the 
CEO to interpret the environment; and thus more opportunity for him to enact 
conditions that  reflect psychological as much  as objective circumstances’ (Miller 
and  Toulouse,  1986a,  p. 1393).  This  finding  is  compatible  with  the  social 
learning theory  of  Rotter,  which  states that  generalized expectancies are  more 
important to  explain behaviour  in  uncertain  and ambiguous  situations (Rotter, 
1975). In a recent study, Powell (1992) also found, in a pooled sample of small 
firms from  two  industries, that firms led  by  internal  CEOs are more profitable 
than  firms headed by  external  CEOs.  Begley  and Boyd’s  (1987) study did  not 
replicate these  findings  in  a  heterogeneous  sample  of  small  firms. This  study, 
however, has a serious shortcoming by not controlling for industry effects as only 
absolute firm performance was measured. Excellent performance in one industry 
may, however, be  average or poor performance in  another setting (MJller and 
Toulouse, 1986b). 
Additionally, two studies report results on the relationship between the locus of 
control of  owner-managers and the  successful startup of small firms (Brockhaus, 
1980; Van de Ven et al.,  1984). Brockhaus (1980) observed that owner-managers 
of  firms that  were  still in  existence three  years after  their  startup,  were  more 
internal than managers of firms that failed during this period. In a similar vein, 
Van de Ven et al. (1984) report that internal control expectancies of the owner- 
manager  are  associated  with  the  success of  recently  established ventures.  The 
results of  the latter study are difficult to generalize due to the very small sample 
size (i.e. 12). 
0  Blackwell Publishers Ltd  1996 CEO LOCUS OF CONTROL 
CEO  (2)  Competitive  (3) 




Figure  1,  An integrative framework of the effect of CEO locus of control on organizational perfor- 
mance 
With  the  notable  exception of Miller and Toulouse  (1986a, b), these  studies 
lack a coherent framework of the impact of CEO locus of control on organiza- 
tional performance.r21  As  a result, the reason  wlp internal CEOs perform  better 
than their external counterparts remains ill-understood. Therefore, we  present  a 
comprehensive integrative framework in figure  1, based on recent suggestions of 
Nahavandi and Malekzadeh (1  993). 
We argue that the influence of CEO locus of control on organizational perfor- 
mance  consists of  two  distinct effects:  an  indirect  effect  mediated  by  strategic 
choice (i.e. the  CEO  ‘strategy formulator’ effect: paths  2  and 3)  and a  direct 
effect (path 1). The latter effect may be the result of other mediating mechanisms 
not  captured  by  strategic  choice.  In  addition,  CEO  locus  of  control  may 
moderate the  relationship between strategy and organizational performance (i.e. 
the  CEO ‘strategy implementor’ effect: path 4).  In the following, we  formulate 
specific hypotheses for each of the  relevant paths,  alongside a  summary of the 
findings of previous locus of control research. Although research with a focus on 
path 2 in isolation does exist (Miller,  1983; Miller et al., 1982), to our knowledge 
Miller and Todouse’s (1986a, b) study is  unique in explicitly elaborating on the 
mediating  role  of  strategic choice  (i.e. paths  2  and  3). Finally,  apart from  the 
study of  Govindarajan (1989), we are unaware of any research on the impact of 
CEO locus of control on the successful implementation of competitive strategies 
(path 4). 
The Bred  Efect of CEO LJXW  of Control (Path  1) 
Abundant  research  on  the locus of control construct  suggests a  direct  effect of 
CEO locus of control on organizational performance. The reason is  that locus of 
control  is  associated with  behaviour  that  logically  relates  to  effective strategic 
leadership. For the sake of the argument, four relevant behavioural consequences 
are discussed below. 
First, the very definition of the concept implies that internals and externals are 
likely  to  use  different kaming  stratqks  regarding  environmental  contingencies of 
success and failure. An individual believing in personal control and acting consis- 
tently  must  actively search  for  laws ruling  the  way  in  which  the  environment 
reacts to  her/his  behaviour.  The more  extensively (s)he probes,  the  better  the 
chances  are  of  detecting  the  crucial  contingencies.  An  internal  individual, 
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confronted with an unfamiliar situation, is  likely to engage in extensive trial-and- 
error  behaviour.  A  believer  in  mere  luck,  whimsical  fate  or manipulation  by 
uncontrollable forces cannot expect any significant pay-off from such behaviour. 
Experimental research (Boone et al.,  1991; Lefcourt, 1982) as well as field studies 
(Miller  et  al.,  1982;  Welsch  and  Young,  1982)  confirmed  this  proposition. 
Internals are more inclined to search for relevant information than externals, and 
seem to learn  more from feedback and past experiences than externals (Phares, 
1976). In this respect, Dollinger (1 984) observed a positive relationship between 
the CEO’s environmental boundary spanning efforts and small firm performance. 
Second, internals generally perform  better than externals in achiarement-related 
domains  such  as  career  track  and  education  (Andrisani  and  Nestel,  1976; 
Lefcourt, 1982; O’Brien,  1984). Achieving long-term goals requires the capacity 
of  delaying immediate gratification (Lefcourt, 1982). It  is  unlikely that  someone 
who believes that achieving long-term goals depends  on luck or external forces, 
can persist in making such sacrifices. A related finding is that internals reveal, on 
average, higher intrinsic motivation than externals (Reeve et al., 1987). 
Third,  salient  for  the  research  on  top  managers  is  that  internals  have 
a  different  leadership  sgle  than  externals.  Internals  use  more  persuasion  to 
influence the  behaviour  of subordinates, while  externals rely  more  on  coercion 
(Goodstadt and Hjelle, 1973;  Johnson  et al.,  1984; Mitchell et al.,  1975). Further- 
more,  task  groups  with  internal  leaders  perform  better  than  groups  led  by 
externals (Anderson and  Schneier,  1978; Johnson  et  al.,  1984). An  important 
explanation  is  that  internal  leaders  are  more  task-oriented,  whereas  external 
leaders  are  more  emotion-oriented  (Anderson  and  Schneier,  1978). Recently, 
Howell  and  Avolio  (1993) found, in  a  sample  of  business-unit managers  of  a 
large  financial institution,  that  internal  managers  show  more  transformational 
leadership  than  external  managers,  r31  where  the  manager’s  transformational 
behaviour  mediates, at least partially, the relationship between  locus of  control 
and unit performance. 
Fourth,  internal  individuals are  less  likely  to  become  ill  after  experiencing 
stressful life  events than external persons.  The locus of control  trait  moderates 
the  relationship between  stress  and illness  (Ganellen and Blaney,  1984; Kobasa, 
1979; Kobasa et al.,  1982), which results from  differences in  coping behaviour 
(Anderson, 1977; Parkes,  1984; Wiebe,  1991). Internals, on the one hand, react 
in a problem-solving way in the face of stressful events. Externals, on the other 
hand, respond emotionally or withdraw from the problem in question. Even in 
the  absence of  stressful life events, internals are less likely than externals to  feel 
depressed or to become dl  (Benassi et al.,  1988). 
All  this  clearly demonstrates  that  internal individuals are characterized by  a 
persistent effort  to  control  their  environment.  After  summarizing the  abundant 
literature, Lefcourt (1982, p.  184) concludes that ‘[als such, locus of  control can 
be  viewed  as a  mediator  of  involved  commitment  in  life  pursuits.  If  one  feels 
helpless to affect important events, then resignation or at least benign indifference 
should become evident, with fewer signs of concern, involvement, and vitality’. 
Hypo0th.ii.s  I:  CEO internality  has  a  positive  direct  effect  on  organizational 
performance: firms with internal  CEOs perform  better  than firms headed by 
external CEOs. 
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lh Indirect Efect of CEO Locus of Control (Paths 2 and 3) 
In  order to  enhance comparison  with previous  research  (Miller  and Toulouse, 
1986a, b), we  adopted  the generic strategies typology of Porter (1980): product 
differentiation, cost leadership and focus. Product differentiation implies offering 
products  or services that customers perceive as unique because  of, for instance, 
innovativeness, design  or  quality.  Miller  and  Toulouse  (1986b) proposed  an 
extension to  the strategy typology of Porter  (1 980) by  distinguishing marketing 
differentiation from innovative differentiation. The former aims at creating brand 
consciousness by  aggressive, mass-marketing efforts such as intensive advertising 
and market segmentation; the  latter  entails image building by product innova- 
tion,  research  and development, high  quality and novel  design. In contrast  to 
both types of product differentiation, firms pursuing cost leadership seek to lower 
their costs of operations, allowing them to sell at prices below their competitors’ 
levels. Finally, when  firms apply product  differentiation or cost leadership to  a 
circumscribed group of customers or a narrow geographic market, they pursue a 
focus or niche strategy. 
Previous research  suggests that  internal  CEOs  are  more  inclined  than  their 
external  counterparts  to  select  complex  and  bold  product-market  innovation 
strategies - i.e.  innovative  differentiation  (Miller,  1983; Miller  and  Toulouse, 
1986a, b;  Miller et al.,  1982). Additionally, internal CEOs are more likely  than 
their  external  colleagues to  engage in  pro-active  strategies (i.e.  being  ahead  of 
competitors instead of following them) and risk  taking (Mdler,  1983; Miller and 
Toulouse,  1986a, b; Miller et al.,  1982).[*] These findings are in line with  the 
frequently  observed  association  between  locus  of  control  and  entrepreneurial 
behaviour (Brockhaus,  1982; Durand and Shea, 1974; Shapero, 1975), following 
from the  observation that  innovation,  pro-activity and risk  taking  entail uncer- 
tainty  and ambiguity. External  CEOs are less  likely to  undertake  such  actions 
because  they  have  less  confidence in  their  ability to  control  the  new  situation 
(Miller,  1983), and  perform  worse  in  ambiguous  and stressful situations  than 
internals (cf. Lefcourt, 1982). 
Concerning the performance  implications of innovative differentiation, Miller 
and Toulouse  (1986b, p. 49) argue that  small firms especially will benefit from 
an innovative strategy because ‘[tlhey can be  in  an excellent position to adapt 
quickly and stay in  close contact  with  a  select group of customers’. The other 
side  of  the  coin  is  that  cost  leadership  and  marketing  differentiation  are less 
suited  as  small  firms  are  at  a  disadvantage  to  achieve  scale  economies  or to 
succeed  in  implementing  mass-marketing  efforts,  respectively.  These  authors 
indeed  report strong relationships between  innovation  and several performance 
indices in  their  sample of  small  As  expected, the pay-off of innovation 
increases in  dynamic  environments,  requiring  the  adaptability  inherent  in  an 
innovation strategy. Similarly, although  a CEO’s internal locus of control has a 
generally positive impact on firm performance, internality is  especially useful in a 
dynamic  environment.  So, Miller and Toulouse  (1986b) argue  that innovation 
mediates the relationship between CEO locus of control and small firm perfor- 
[6l  mance. 
All  these  findings  pertain  to  heterogeneous  samples  with  a  tremendous 
diversity of  industries including, for  instance, electronics, financial  services and 
mining (Mdler  and Toulouse,  1986b). As  the present  study focuses on  a  single 
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fragmented industry, the specific context of  the Flemish furniture industry has to 
be taken into account before formulating hypotheses. Several scholars in different 
countries have characterized the furniture industry as stable and mature (for the 
Flemish  furniture  industry  see  Boone,  1992; for  the  US  furniture  industry  see 
Powell,  1992; for the Dutch furniture industry see Nijssen,  1992). Powell (1992), 
for instance, analysed the competitive stability of many US industries, concluding 
that ‘[tlhe furniture industry ranked as one of the most stable of all the manufac- 
turing  industries  reviewed’  (p.  124).  This  low  environmental  turbulence, 
associated with  slow technological and market developments, characterizes most 
industries in  the  maturity  stage of  the  life  cycle  (Hellriegel and Slocum,  1992). 
The furniture industry is highly fragmented with many small firms (Boone, 1992; 
Nijssen, 1992). In the Flemish furniture industry, for instance, above 80 per cent 
of  the firms have fewer than  20 employees (Febelhout, 1987). These specifics of 
the furniture industry have implications for (i) the selection of  relevant strategies 
(path 2) and (ii) their likely performance impact (path 3). 
For  one, the  highly fragmented  nature  of  the  furniture industry implies that 
the  majority  of  firms  focuses  on  specific market  niches.  Consequently,  in  the 
present  study we  do not  distinguish  ‘focus’ as  a  separate  generic  strategy, but 
rather  concentrate  on  competitive advantage  by  means  of  product  uniqueness 
(product  differentiation) and low  cost  (cost  leadership).  Moreover,  Miller  and 
Toulouse’s (1986a, b) concept of innovative differentiation refers to bold product 
innovations  (e.g.  from  mechanical  to  electrical  calculators), backed  up  with  a 
strong emphasis on  research  and  development  (R & D). The opportunities  for 
such radical innovations in the furniture industry are extremely limited (Nijssen, 
1992). In fact, none of the furniture firms in the present  sample has an R & D 
department. Nevertheless, we  expect that internal CEOs, because of their entre- 
preneurial  nature,  are  inclined  to  pursue  relatiueb  innovative  strategies  even 
within  a  traditional  industry. An  industry  expert of  Febelhout,  the professional 
association of the Belgian furniture industry, argued that product  differentiation 
through superior product design and quality can be considered to be an innova- 
tive  strategy compared to  the  traditional  strategy of  production  cost minimiza- 
tion.  So,  our  conceptualization  of  product  differentiation,  which  does  not 
incorporate  bold  product  innovation  and  R & D,  is  a  subset  of  Miller  and 
Toulouse’s ( 198613) innovation differentiation. 
HypothesZr 2:  Internal CEOs are more inclined to pursue a relatively innovative 
strategy than  external  CEOs: CEO internality  is  associated with  a  product 
differentiation strategy in the furniture industry. 
The second implication of  the  furniture industry  context  relates to  the  perfor- 
mance  implications of  the  generic  strategies  (path  3).  Recall  that  Miller  and 
Toulouse (1  986b) observed a strong relationship between innovative differentia- 
tion  and  organizational  performance  in  their  heterogeneous  sample  of  small 
firms. In our view, however, these authors did not control  adequately for inter- 
industry differences. For instance, it is likely that Miller and Toulouse’s industries 
differ  considerably  with  respect  to  their  life  cycle  stage.  If  the  stage  of  the 
industry life  cycle is  associated with the occurrence of both innovation and profit 
potential,  then  the  relationship  between  innovation  and performance  may  be 
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spurious. In  any  case,  their  assertion  as  to  the  universal  utility  of  small  firm 
innovation is inconsistent with the fundamental paradigm of strategy, stating that: 
[i]n  order to  perform  well,  the  firm  must  compete  in  settings in  which  the 
prerequisites for success  ~  the ‘key success factors’  ~  match the firm’s distinctive 
competencies or strengths. Viewed conversely, the firm must develop strengths 
that match the key success factors in its industry. (Sousa and Hambrick,  1989, 
p. 367) 
Indeed, the bulk of strategic group research suggests that the performance impli- 
cations of different strategies vary from industry to industry (Thomas and Venka- 
traman,  1988).  In  addition,  theory  and  evidence  support  the  notion  of 
equifinality  in  many  industries: that  is,  several  strategies may  generate  success 
within  the  same industry (Porter,  1980; Snow and Hrebiniak,  1980). Given the 
complex relationship  between  strategy and performance,  a grion’  hypotheses on 
the performance implications of product differentiation and cost leadership in the 
furniture  industry  are  not  warranted.  Nevertheless,  a  CEO’s  internal  locus  of 
control  may  be  dysfunctional if  the  ‘key success factors’ of  an industry  fail  to 
match with the CEO’s strategic preferences. 
7he Moderating Efect  of CEO  Locw  of Control  (Path 4) 
Several  inertial  forces  may  limit  the  discretion  of  the  CEO (i.e.  latitude  for 
action) to realize  her/his  strategic preferences (Hambrick and Finkelstein,  1987; 
Hannan  and  Freeman,  1984).  For  instance,  Boeker  (1989)  observed  that, 
although strategies change from time to time, the strategic preferences of a firm’s 
founder have an ongoing and profound impact on the strategic direction of the 
firm. This implies that strategies can partly be given for CEOs at each moment 
in  time  (Gupta,  1988). Then,  the  primary  task  of  a  CEO does  not  so  much 
consist of the (re)formulation of strategies but rather of the successful implementa- 
tion of strategies. We argue that the effectiveness of a given strategy depends on, 
among other things, the locus of control of CEOs. 
To our knowledge, Govindarajan (1989) is  unique in investigating CEO locus 
of  control  as a moderating variable by  analysing whether  the characteristics of 
general  managers  should  be  matched  with  the  competitive strategy of  strategic 
business  units  (SBUs) in  order  to  increase  unit  performance.”]  Govindarajan’s 
hypothesis relating the SBU general manager’s locus of control to SBU competi- 
tive strategy and performance follows from four arguments: 
(1)  internals  and externals  have  different capacities for  effective information 
processing;  (2)  different  competitive  strategies  have  different  information- 
processing requirements;  (3) an SBU will be  more  effective when  there is  a 
match  between  its  information-processing requirements  and its  information 
processing capacity; (4)  thus, matching SBU general manager’s locus of control 
with  SBU competitive strategy is  likely to be  associated with superior perfor- 
mance. (Govindarajan, 1989, p. 254) 
Govindarajan distinguishes two generic strategies: product differentiation and low 
cost. He argues that the information-processing requirements and uncertainty  are 
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higher for SBUs with a product differentiation strategy than for SBUs following a 
low-cost  strategy.  The  reason  is  that  a  low-cost  strategy,  in  contrast  with  a 
product  differentiation strategy, is  associated with  relatively simple and standar- 
dized  products.  Furthermore,  the  tasks  associated  with  cost  leadership  are 
generally of  a repetitive nature, and the number of  options available to a differ- 
entiator  is  normally  larger  for  a  low-cost  strategist, where  all  energy  must  be 
focused on achieving a single aim: reducing costs. 
On top of all this, internals and externals have different information-processing 
capabilities.  Spector  (1  982),  who  summarized  the  abundant  literature  on 
employee locus of control, concludes that: 
[alnother difference between internals  and externals is  their  ability to handle 
complex information. Internals seem better at collecting and processing infor- 
mation  and would  be  better  at performing  complex  tasks.  This  tendency  is 
totally independent of  intelligence (Phares,  1976), suggesting that perhaps it is 
motivation that accounts for the performance differential. Internals would seem 
better  suited for tasks requiring complex information collection or processing. 
(Spector, 1982, p. 494) 
Internal  general  managers  are  probably  better  able  to  implement  a  product 
differentiation strategy. Indeed, Govindarajan (1  989) found that the contribution 
of  a product differentiation strategy to SBU performance is higher with internal 
than  external  general  managers.  The opposite is  the  case  for  low-cost  SBUs: 
external general managers are more effective in implementing a low-cost strategy 
than  their  internal counterparts. Although  Govindarajan  (1989) does not  expli- 
citly  explain  the  latter  finding,  it  is  consistent  with  existing locus  of  control 
research: routine  and clearly  structured tasks  increase  and decrease  motivation 
among  externals  and  internals,  respectively  (Spector,  1982). In  this  respect, 
Runyon (1973) reports that internal employees are more satisfied with supervision 
than external employees under a participative leadership style, whereas externals 
are more satisfied than internals under a directive style. 
hypo the^ 3: The contribution of  a product differentiation strategy to organiza- 
tional performance is  higher in the case of internal CEOs than in the case of 
external CEOs. 
Hypothks  4:  The contribution  of  a  low-cost strategy to  organizational perfor- 
mance  is  lower  in  the  case  of  internal  CEOs  than  in  the  case  of  external 
CEOs. 
METHODS 
Sample and Data  Colhction Procedure 
We selected the furniture industry to analyse the integrative framework for three 
reasons. First, as already mentioned above, previous research is mainly based on 
heterogeneous samples. Of course, there is  nothing wrong with such a sampling 
strategy as long as the analysis adequately controls for inter-industry differences 
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and other possibly confounding variables. In our view, this is  not the case in the 
reviewed studies. To be sure, identikng and measuring all possible confounding 
effects  remain  a  difficult and  tedious  task.  In  addition,  the  problem  becomes 
even more complex if the effect of some variables of interest is contingent  upon 
the level of (unmeasured) confounding variables. In this respect, we  refer again to 
strategic  group  research  suggesting  that  the  effect  of  competitive  strategies 
depends  on  the  specifics  of  the  industry  context.  We  therefore  chose a  more 
modest approach by  testing the hypotheses in a fairly homogeneous population 
of  ‘natural’ competitors  (cf.  Powell,  1992). Although  such  a  sampling  strategy 
does  not  allow  us  to  generalize  to  other  settings  or  industries  (low  external 
validity), we  can  now  adequately  control  for confounding effects (high  internal 
validity).  It  is  generally  accepted  that  internal  validity  of  research  findings 
decreases rapidly when external validity is increased (Cook and Campbell, 1979). 
Given  this  trade-off,  we  agree  with  Cook  and  Campbell  that  high  internal 
validity  is  to  be  preferred  to  high  external  validity.  Generalizing  findings that 
may not be internally valid, is not very useful. 
Second, the  furniture industry consists of  many  small firms in  a  fragmented 
market, so that a reasonable sample size can be generated. Third, most firms in 
this industry are small and family owned, which implies that power is centralized 
in  the  hands  of  the  CEO, enlarging  the  potential  influence of  CEO locus  of 
control on organizational variables Wller and Toulouse,  1986a). 
The present  paper  is  part  of  a  broader  research  project  on  CEO locus  of 
control, which  required  participation  of the  other members  of the top manage- 
ment team, defined as the  group of managers one hierarchical  level  below the 
CEO (Boone, 1992). Therefore, the firms in our sample had to be large enough, 
consisting of at least three hierarchical levels. Consequently, instead of drawing a 
random sample from the population of furniture firms,[81  we  considered only the 
‘largest’ furniture companies with total  assets above $1.2  million (a total of  153 
firms). The first author interviewed every CEO who agreed  to take part in the 
study (81 out  of  153). After the  interview, we  administered  and explained  two 
questionnaires. The first questionnaire contained the locus of control measure, to 
be filled in by the CEO (CEO questionnaire); the second was  designed to assess 
the competitive strategy of the firm (strategy questionnaire). We asked the CEO 
to pass the latter questionnaire to a lower-level top manager which (s)he deemed 
most  knowledgeable  on  the  firm’s  strategy.  Participation  of  lower-level  top 
managers was  voluntary. A reminder followed three weeks  after the initial visit. 
We  made  assurances that  all provided  information  would  remain  strictly confi- 
dential. We  used  financial data from  annual reports,  centralized  on CD-ROM 
by  the  National  Bank  of  Belgium,  to  measure  firm  performance.  So,  three 
different  sources  were  examined  to  obtain  data  on  CEO  locus  of  control, 
strategy and performance. 
The latter procedure, which we  designed to  avoid common method variance 
(Podsakoff and  Organ,  1986), appeared  to  have  drawbacks.  First,  five  CEOs 
refused  to  involve lower-level top  managers  in  the  present  study.  Second,  the 
likelihood  of  incomplete  information  was  increased.  For  instance,  64  CEO 
questionnaires and 60 strategy questionnaires were returned. However, notwith- 
standing  this  high  response  rate,  matching  these  questionnaires  provided  ‘full’ 
information  on only 55 companies. On top  of  this,  several questionnaires were 
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only partially completed. This was  especially the  case for the  strategy question- 
naire,  probably  because  small  firm  owner-managers  generally  are  hesitant  to 
share strategic information with  outsiders (Robinson and Pearce,  1984).[” Also, 
many  respondents complained that they were  very busy. As  a result of missing 
data,  the  number  of  useful  observations varies from  variable  to  variable.  We 
preferred  to  drop  cases  with  missing  values  throughout,  leaving  a  total  of  40 
observations. Despite the subsequent removals, the aggregate response rate is  26 
per cent (40 out of  153 initially contacted firms), which is reasonable and similar 
to  those  reported  in  other  studies  requiring  participation  of  CEOs  and  top 
management (Powell, 1992). 
The performance  (i.e.  gross  profit  margin  and return  on assets) of  the  firms 
included in  the present  sample does not  differ significantly from  (1) the perfor- 
mance of the firms which refused to participate, and (2) the average performance 
of the entire furniture industry. This suggests that this paper’s sample is represen- 
tative.  The sample firms  are  small  with  a  mean  number  of  employees of  80 
(median = 53; SD = 81) and mean sales of $9.4 million (median = $5.8 million; 
SD = $7.6  million). All  CEOs  are  male,  with  mean  age  of  46  (median = 46; 
SD = 10) and mean tenure of 14 (median = 12; SD = 10). 
Meafures” O1 
Small business  researchers  emphasize profitability as  the  primary  performance 
measure for low market share firms (Hammermesh et al., 1978; Robinson, 1983). 
Following the recommendations of Haleblian and Finkelstein (1993), we  collected 
three  profitability  indicators to  obtain  a  reliable measure  of  small firm  perfor- 
mance: cash  flow on assets, return on assets and gross profit margin.  The first 
two  ratios assess the firm’s overall profitability. We included cash flow on assets 
to  account  for  possible  differences  in  depreciation  accounting  practices.  The 
gross profit margin  stresses the firm’s operational efficiency. Each of  these ratios 
is  a standard indicator of  profitability (Van  Horne,  1983), and is  widely used in 
both  large (Capon et al.,  1990) and small (Powell, 1992; Robinson  and Pearce, 
1988) business research. Small firm performance can vary substantially from year 
to year (Welsh and White,  1981). To account for such variation,  we  computed 
two-year averages of the performance  indices. As  a result, a CEO with a tenure 
of less  than  two years was  dropped from subsequent analyses (leaving  a  sample 
Table I.  Results of factor analysis of performance 
indices: factor matrix and percentage of variance 
explained 
Fattor  f 
Performance indices: 
Cash flow on assets 
Return on assets 




Percentage of variance explained  82.2 
Not&: 
n = 39 
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size of 39). To obtain an overall pdormance index, we  computed factor scores with 
a  principal  components  analysis of  the  three  performance  indicators  (variable 
name  PERF).  Table  I  shows  the  results.  Only  one  factor  with  an eigenvalue 
larger than one was  extracted,  accounting  for 82 per  cent of  variance. All  the 
performance indicators had factor loadings larger than 0.85. 
To establish the  convergent validity of this  overall performance measure,  we 
sent a short follow-up questionnaire to the CEOs in the present  sample so as to 
obtain  subjective performance evaluations. Ten CEOs returned  information  on 
the extent to which they are satisfied with the overall performance of their firm 
(on a  five-point scale, ranging from not  at all  satisfied to  highly satisfied). The 
correlation  coefficient  between  this  subjective  performance  measure  and  the 
‘objective’ factor scores is very high  (r = 0.82, with p  = 0.002), which (i) provides 
strong evidence for the validity of  our compounded performance measure,  and 
(ii) suggests that profitability is indeed a major corporate objective in the mind of 
small business CEOs (Bhatty, 1981). 
We measured  CEO Locus  of control with the well-known Rotter I-E scale (Rotter, 
1966)’ translated  in  Dutch  by  the  first two  authors  (variable name  LOC). The 
original scale contains 23 forced-choice locus of control items and six filler items. 
In the present study, a higher score reflects higher internality. We increased the 
number  of  filler items to  14 to obscure the  purpose  of  the  test. Several studies 
demonstrate the  reliability  and validity  of  this  translated  scale  (Boone and De 
Brabander,  1993; Boone et al.,  1990; Boone et  al.,  1991; De Brabander  et al., 
1992). In this sample, Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach, 195  1) is  0.69, which concurs 
with  the  internal  consistencies  reported  by  Rotter  (1966) and  Robinson  and 
Shaver  (1973) and  is  well  above  the  lower  limits  of  acceptability  (generally 
considered to be around 0.50 to 0.60; Nunnally, 1978). 
As  competitive  strategy  can  be  interpreted  as  a  pattern  in  the  stream  of 
important decisions (Mmtzberg, 1978), we  selected six  strategy variables so as to 
create  composite  measures  of  cost  leadership  and  product  d@mtiation.  The  six 
variables were selected because: (1) they can be  controlled by  CEOs (Finkelstein 
and Hambrick,  1990), and (2) they are deemed  to be indicative of the strategic 
profiles  of cost leadership and product  differentiation (Wright  et al.,  1991). We 
collected three indicators  of  product  differentiation: advertising intensity (adver- 
tising/sales), product design emphasis (number of full-time design personnel/total 
employment), and salaried salesperson intensity (number of salaried salespersons/ 
total  employment). These  variables represent  basic  resource  commitments  that 
permit  furniture  firms  to  create  and  sell  unique  and  differentiated  products 
(McNamee and McHugh, 1989). 
The  following  three  dimensions  are  associated  with  a  low-cost  strategy: 
computer  numerical  control  (CNC) investment  intensity  (investments in  CNC 
processes/sales),  average  price  compared  to  competitors,  and  distribution 
intensity. Following other researchers (Hambrick,  1983; Wright et al.,  1991), we 
assume  that  firms invest in  sophisticated CNC machines  to  improve  manufac- 
turing  efficiency. We  assessed the  average price level  of the firms’ products by 
asking  the  respondents  to  compare  their  prices  with  those  of  competitors, 
indicating their judgement on a seven-point scale (ranging from 0, average price 
level  (more than)  10 per  cent  below  that  of  major  competitors,  to  6,  average 
price level (more than)  10 per cent above that of major competitors; cf. Phillips, 
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1981). Of course,  average  to  low  prices  would  be  consistent with  a  low-cost 
strategy (Wright et al., 1991). 
The measurement  and selection of  the 'distribution  intensity' variable require 
elaboration.  Basically,  furniture  firms  can  choose  among  five  distribution 
channels: direct  sale  to  final  consumer,  small  retailers,  large  retailers  (such as 
IKEA),  purchasing  organizations"  and  other  furniture  manufacturers  (i.e. 
subcontracting). The respondents were asked to estimate the percentage  of  sales 
realized  through  each  of  these  distribution  channels.  We  define  distribution 
intensity  as  the  extent  to  which  sales  are  spread  over  Werent  distribution 
channels.  For  this  purpose,  we  computed  the  following  index  (Michel  and 
Hambrick,  1992): 
where  Pi  is  the  proportion  of  sales  realized through  channel  i  (i = 1 to  5). A 
single-channel firm has  an index of  0,  and the  maximum value  (i.e.  1-1/5)  is 
reached if  the proportions  are equal among all channels. Diversifjrlng sales over 
several  channels  is  likely  to  increase  operational  efficiency  by  lowering  the 
demand  risk  associated  with  specific  channels.  That  is,  intensive  distribution 
provides the  opportunity  to  stabilize the utilization of  capacity and to maintain 
smooth  production  operations.  Additionally,  such  a  strategy  may  facilitate 
reaping economies of scale and scope. 
In  order  to  explore  the  validity  of  the  strategy  measures,  we  applied  a 
principal  components  analysis  with  a  varimax  rotation  to  the  six  strategy 
variables. The factor analysis extracted  two  factors with eigenvalues larger than 
one, accounting for 57 per cent of variance. Table I1 reports the factor loadings. 
A clear factor structure emerged. The three product differentiation variables load 
positively on the first factor. In addition, these variables are related to charging 
high  prices.  Distribution  and  CNC  investment  intensities  have  high  positive 
loadings on the second factor, and are - as expected - associated with charging 
a  low  average  price.  Moreover,  advertising  intensity  loads  negatively  on  the 
Table  11.  Results of  factor analysis of  strategy indices: rotated 
factor matrix and percentage of variance explained 
Factor  1  Factor  2 
Product differentiation: 
Advertising intensity  0.27  -  0.42 
Product design emphasis  0.85  -  0.08 
Salaried salesmen intensity  0.90  -0.07 
Low cost: 
CNC investment intensity  -0.00  0.7 1 
Distribution intensity  -  0.02  0.75 
Average price charged  0.50  -0.56 
Percentage of variance explained  37.7  19.2 
.Not&: 
n = 39 
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second factor. Clearly, the factors can be labelled product differentiation and low 
cost, respectively. The highly interpretable factor structure allows us  to work with 
the  factor  scores  as  composite  measures  of  product  differentiation and  cost 
leadership (variable names DIF and COST, respectively). 
In  a  number  of  studies,  cost  leadership  and  product  differentiation  are 
conceived as two opposites on a single continuum (as is  the case in the study of 
Govindarajan,  1989). This implies the  assumption that  a  firm  with  a  product 
differentiation  strategy does not  focus  on  low  cost  by  definition. In  our view, 
such a  conceptualization is  not warranted for  two reasons.  First, research using 
factor analysis to validate the typology of Porter (1980) suggests that cost leader- 
ship and product differentiation frequently arise as orthogonal factors (Dess  and 
Davis,  1984; Robinson  and  Pearce,  1988), which  is  consistent with  the  factor 
solution reported in  table 11.  Second, and related, recent findings indicate that 
some firms are  able  to  pursue both  cost  leadership  and  product  differentiation 
successfdy  (Wright  et  al.,  1991), notwithstanding  the  ‘stuck  in  the  middle’ 
argument of Porter (1  980). 
Additionally, we  incorporated three  alternative determinants of  firm  perfor- 
mance as covariates. First, we  included the number of  employees to control for 
differences in  organizational size (variable name SIZE), which takes into account a 
myriad of possible confounding effects, such as economies of scale, differences in 
organizational structure and market power. Second, we  used financial data from 
annual reports  to  compute  the  acid-test  ratio,  which  measures the  amount  of 
liquid  resources not  committed to  liabilities in  the  near  future (variable name 
LIQ. Bourgeois  (1981) and  Singh (1986) proposed  this  ratio  as  a  measure  of 
‘unabsorbed’ slack.  Welsh  and White (1981) have argued that small firms tend to 
suffer from what they call a chronic ‘resource poverty’ (cf. Robinson, 1983). This 
is  the  result  of,  among other things, fierce competition in fragmented markets. 
Consequently, relatively minor events, such as the loss  of  an important customer 
or  a  bad  decision  by  the  CEO,  may  threaten  the  very  survival  of  small 
companies. Due to limited access to external financing, small businesses have to 
build ‘unabsorbed‘ slack as a buffer against unexpected cash shortages. As Welsh 
and White (1981, p. 29) argue, ‘[lliquidity is  a matter of  life  and death for the 
smd  business’. 
Finally, we  included an additional CEO-level characteristic, tnzure, which has 
been shown to be related to small firm performance (variable name TEN). Speci- 
fically,  Miller  (1991) argued that long-tenured CEOs tend to grow ‘stale in  the 
saddle’, and therefore fail to match continuously the strategy and structure with 
the requirements of the external environment, which may eventually compromise 
organizational performance.  Miller’s  (1  99 1,  p. 47)  analysis  indeed  reveals  that 
‘[t]  he  (negative) relationship between  tenure  and  performance  seems  to  work 
through the (mis)match between strategy and environment’ (parentheses added). 
Data Ana&sis 
In this section, we  present two sets of hierarchical regression analyses. In the first 
set LOC, DIF and PERF are the focal variables of  interest, allowing us  to test 
hypotheses 1 to  3. The second set pertains to hypothesis 4,  predicting that CEO 
locus  of  control  moderates  the  relationship between  COST and  PERF.  We 
opted for two  separate analyses in order to keep the regression models as parsi- 
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monious as possible, which is necessary due to the relatively small sample size. 
Concerning the first set of analyses, the integrative framework suggests that the 
total effect of  LOC on PERF can be decomposed into (1) a direct effect and (2) 
an  indirect  effect  through  competitive  strategy (i.e.  DIF).  The  CEO  ‘strategy 
implementor’ effect implies testing for a sigdicant interaction between LOC and 
DIF. In  order to  analyse  the  integrative  framework presented in  figure  1, the 
following set of hierarchical regression analyses is performed 
(1)  PERF = A + BISIZE + B2LIQ+ &TEN  + B4LOC. 
(2) 
(3) 
PERF = A + B5SIZE  + B&IQ  + &TEN  + &LOC  + BgDIF. 
PERF = A + BloSIZE + B1  lLIQ + Bl2TEN + B13LOC + &&IF 
+ B15LOC * DIF. 
The regression  coefficient B4  provides  an  estimate  of  the  total  effect  of  CEO 
locus of  control after controlling for SIZE, LIQ  and TEN (Cohen and Cohen, 
1983). The direct effect of CEO locus of  control is  obtained by  regressing PERF 
on both LOC and DIF (ie. B8 from equation (2); cf. hypothesis 1). The indirect 
effect  of  CEO locus  of  control  is  determined by  analysing the  change  of  the 
regression coefficient of  LOC when  DIF is  added to  the  equation (Cohen and 
Cohen, 1983): B4 minus B8  represents an estimate of  the indirect effect of  LOC 
via DIF. Of course, a substantial change of the coefficient of LOC indicates that 
internal CEOs  are  inclined  to  pursue  Werent strategies than  external CEOs 
(hypothesis 2). Finally, we  add a product-term (LOC * DIF) to equation (2) so as 
to analyse the  moderating role of CEO locus of control (hypothesis 3). A signifi- 
cant and positive B15  implies that the  contribution of  a product differentiation 
to  organizational performance is  higher  for  internal than  for  external 
If  a dependent variable Y  is simultaneously regressed on a product-term (e.g. 
Xa  and its constituents (e.g. X  and <  as in  equation (3)), the regression coeffi- 
cients of X and 5  (in the present study, B13  and B14)  cannot be  meaningfully 
interpreted for two reasons. The first reason pertains to the case where X  and < 
are based on interval scale data, as is  true for LOC and DIF. As interval scales 
have  an  arbitrary origin, any linear  transformation  of  such  scales  should  not 
affect the  results of  estimating equation (3). However, the regrehion coefficients 
of X  and <  (including their  t values, partial and semipartial correlations) and the 
constant A are not invariant under linear transformations (Cohen, 1978). This is 
not true for the coefficient of  the product-term (Xa  whose statistical significance 
remains constant over any linear transformation of  X  and  <.[13]  Put differently, 
the values of  the regression coefficients of X  and 5  depend on their scaling, and 
are therefore meaningless. 
strate%]  CEOs. 
Second, Cohen warns that: 
[tlhe simultaneous analysis of X,  5  and Xz  results in general in the distortion 
of  the  partial coefficients for  X and 5  since they  are  (usually substantially) 
correlated with Xz  and  the partialing process results in  the  latter removing 
some (probably much) of the X  and <variance.  Thus, even aside from lack of 
invariance  over  linear  transformation,  such  a  simultaneous analysis  is,  in 
general,  inappropriate  for  analytical  purposes  when  product  variables  are 
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involved. The partialed X<.X,<  (i.e. the X..  product from which its constitu- 
ents X  and 5  have been linearly partialed) is the interaction, but X  or 5  from 
which X<  is  partialed is, in general, arbitrary  nonsense. The problem  lies  in 
the  simultaneous  model,  in  which  all  IVs  (i.e.  independent  variables)  are 
partialed from all others. (Cohen, 1978, p. 861; parentheses added) 
Concerning  the  second  set  of  analyses  we  re-run  equations  (1) to  (3) after 
substituting DIF for COST. Hypothesis 4, which predicts that a low-cost strategy 
contributes more  to  organizational performance  in  the  case  of  external  CEOs 
than in  the  case  of internal CEOs, is  supported if  the  regression coefficient of 
LOC * COST is negative and sigmficantly different from zero. 
RESULTS 
Table I11  reports descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations. We present the 
results  of  the  two  sets of  hierarchical regression analyses in Table IV.  For the 
sake of  clarity, we  report  both  unstandardized  regression  coefficients as well  as 
the associated semipartial correlation coefficients (i.e. sr).[14] 
Consistent  with  previous  findings, firms  headed  by  internal  CEOs perform 
better than firms with  external CEOs. Specifically, the sr based on equation  (1) 
(i.e. the total effect  of  LOC) equals 0.36 (p = 0.019). Note  that the  semipartial 
correlation between LOC and  PERF increases when  DIF is added to equation 
(1).  That  is,  the  sr  changes  from  0.36  (p = 0.019;  equation  (1))  to  0.40 
(p = 0.009; equation  (2)). The latter  coefficient  remains  exactly the same when 
COST is  added to  equation  (1)  (from 0.36  (p = 0.019) to  0.36  (p = 0.009))."51 
The findings pertaining to equation (2) therefore suggest, as expected, that there 
is  (1)  a  substantial direct  effect  of  LOC  on  PERF,  and  (2) a  small  negative 
indirect effect of LOC on PERF through DIF. Indeed, the zero-order correlation 
between LOC and DIF reveals that internal CEOs are more inclined to pursue a 
product  differentiation  strategy  than  their  external  counterparts  (r = 0.30  with 
p  = 0.033).['61 A product  differentiation strategy, in  turn,  contributes negatively 
to  organizational performance  (sr = -0.19  with  p  = 0.206).  This  implies  that 
DIF suppresses the 'true' effect of CEO locus of control on organizational perfor- 
mance  (Cohen  and  Cohen,  1983). Thus,  the  inclination  of  internal  CEOs to 
prefer (relatively) innovative strategies is  dysfunctional in  the  furniture industry. 
However, the negative indirect effect is more than compensated by a substantial 
direct impact, so that the net  (i.e. total) effect of CEO locus of control remains 
positive and significant. This pattern of findings confirms hypotheses 1 and 2. 
The observation that DIF is  negatively and COST positively (sr = 0.41 with 
p  = 0.003) related to  PERF can  be  understood in  light  of  the  specifics  of the 
furniture  industry mentioned  above.  First,  theory  and  research  suggest  that  a 
low-cost  strategy  is  frequently  positively  or  at least  not  negatively  related  to 
performance in mature and stable industries (Anderson and Zeithaml, 1984; Dess 
and  Davis,  1984;  Hambrick,  1983;  Hambrick  and  Schecter,  1983;  Prescott, 
1986). Second, the  long-range orientation  normally  associated with  a  product 
differentiation  strategy  may  be  less  suited  for  small  firms.  Here,  Cohn  and 
Lindberg (1972, p. 2) argue  that:  'The  smaller  quantities of  goods purchased, 
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Table IV.  OLS regression estimates of the effect of CEO locus of control on performance 
Equation (1)  Equation  (2)  Equation (3) 
B  ST  B  ST  B  ST 
(s.e.)  (s.e.)  (s.e.) 

















COST * LOC 
F-value 
R2 
-2.093**  - 
-  0.00 1  -0.1  1 
(0.736) 
(0.002) 
0.699*  0.37* 
(0.277) 
(0.0 15) 
0.109*  0.36* 
(0.044) 
-  0.005  -  0.05 
3.216* 
0.27 
-  -  2.093" 
-0.001  -0.11 
(0.736) 
(0.002) 
0.699*  0.37* 
(0.277) 
(0.015) 
0.109*  0.36* 




-2.321"  - 
-0.002  -0.15 
(0.751) 
(0.002) 
0.651*  0.34* 
(0.277) 
(0.015) 
0.129**  0.40** 
(0.047) 
(0.156) 
-  0.005  -  0.04 
-0.202  -0.19 
2.955* 
0.31 
-  1.958**  - 
(0.655) 
-  0.002  -0.14 
(0.002) 
0.470f  0.247 
(0.256) 
0.002  0.02 
(0.014) 
0.109"  0.36** 
(0.039) 





-0.001  -  0.09 
(0.002) 
0.654'  0.34* 
(0.261) 
(0.0  15) 
-0.010  -0.10 
NI  NI 
NI  NI 




NI  - 
-  0.002  -0.17 
(0.002) 
0.560*  0.27* 
(0.274) 
0.004  0.04 
(0.014) 
NI  NI 
NI  NI 





n = 39 
B = Unstandardized regression coefficient; and SI = semipartial correlation 
NI = hot interpretable (see text) 
7)  < 0.10;  *p < 0.05; *.p  < 0.01 
fewer  salesmen,  lower  inventory  levels,  smaller  outlays  for  advertising  and 
promotion, and similar characteristics of  small businesses seldom justie the  risk 
or costs imposed by long-range plans.' 
Hypothesis 3 is  confirmed, too, as the regression  coefficient of  LOG * DIF is 
positive and significantly different from zero. The associated semipartial correla- 
tion  is  0.31  @I  = 0.031). Thus,  consistent  with  the  findings  of  Govindarajan 
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CEO 
locus of control 
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.30'  Product  -.19  Organizational 
differentiation  performance 
CEO 
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n 5 39 
We report  the semiparrial  correlations associated with  the first set of  hierarchical regression analyses (see table 
w. 
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01 
Figure 2.  Results of the integrative framework relating CEO locus of control to organizational per- 
formance 
(1989), internal CEOs are more effective in implementing a product differentia- 
tion  strategy  than  external  CEOs.  Apparently,  internal  CEOs  are  able  to 
compensate the main negative impact of  DIF on PERF. 
Hypothesis 4,  however, is not confirmed. The sr of LOC * COST equals 0.12, 
which  is  not  significant (p  = 0.350).  This  does not  corroborate  the  findings of 
Govindarajan  (1  989).  Recall  that  Govindarajan's  study  pertains  to  general 
managers of SBUs whose main task is to implement a given strategy. In contrast, 
the  majority  of  CEOs  in  the  furniture  industry  own  a  substantial  part  of 
company shares. Additionally, they are clearly responsible for the formulation of 
the  firm's  business  policy.  It  is  therefore  likely  that  the  CEOs  in  the  present 
study  feel  more  personally committed  to  their  company  and its  strategy than 
SBU general managers. Perhaps this high commitment may buffer the negative 
consequences of an incongruence between locus of  control and the task charac- 
teristics associated with a low-cost strategy. 
Concerning  the  control  variables,  LIQ  is  positively  related  to  PERF,  as 
expected (sr = 0.37 with p  = 0.017; equation (1)). The regression  coefficients of 
SIZE and TEN are  not  significant. The former suggests that  scale  economies 
are  absent  in  the  furniture  industry; the  latter may  be  the  result  of  the  stable 
and  mature  nature  of  this  market.  Probably,  the  tendency  of  long-tenured 
CEOs to  adhere  to  the  status quo is  less  likely  to compromise  organizational 
performance  in  such  stable  settings  (Hambrick  and  Fukutomi,  1991;  Miller, 
199  1).  That  is,  successful  co-alignments  between  organizational  strategy, 
structure  and  environment  may  only  deteriorate  slowly  when  there  is  little 
change in the environment. 
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The  findings  of  the  present  study  are  summarized  in  terms  of  the  paths 
outlined in figure  1 by reporting the semipartial correlations associated with the 
first set of hierarchical regression analyses in figure 2. 
DISCUSSION 
An Integrative Perspective 
The current  state  of  the  art  in  the  CEO locus of  control  literature is  biased 
toward partial mappings of bivariate associations between CEO locus of control 
and organizational outcomes. Although such studies are a worthwhile contribu- 
tion to the literature, they only produce fragmented understanding. This is why 
the  current  paper  proposes  an  integrative  model.  The key  ingredient  of  this 
integration  is  the  introduction  of  the  intermediary role  of  strategy formulation 
and implementation  (cf.  figure  1).  In effect, the  established bivariate hypotheses 
are  nested  in  the  integrative  model.  Here,  empirical  testing  reveals  that  the 
robust finding of the positive influence of CEO locus of control on organizational 
performance is  confirmed. However, this paper’s results move beyond replicating 
this well-established finding. 
The key contribution  of  this paper is  a quest for an explanation of wb  CEO 
locus of control may matter so much. It is  here where the strategy issue enters. 
Basically, the  revealed  explanation  is  composed  of three  elements. First,  CEO 
locus  of  control  relates  significantly  to  strategy  choice.  That  is,  internality  is 
associated  with  a  product  differentiation  strategy.  This  is  the  CEO’s  role  of 
strategy formulator.  Second,  this product  differentiation strategy per  se  impedes 
organizational performance.  Put  differently, the  environmental  contingencies of 
the  Flemish  furniture  industry  align  with  cost  leadership  rather  than  product 
differentiation. Third,  and  this  is  the  key  finding, the positive  impact  of  CEO 
internality overcompensates this downside of  an unfitting strategy choice of internal 
CEOs.  Apparently,  internal  CEOs  achieve  higher  organizational  performance 
irrespective of strategy content. This points to the importance of the CEO’s role 
of implementor. So, testing the integrative framework deepens our understanding 
of what  drives the  success of internal CEOs.  Specifically, it suggests that  what 
differentiates internal  from  external  CEOs,  is  the  former’s  ability  to  implement 
successfully whatever strategy. As a result, future models of ‘executive leadership’ 
should not  only focus  on  strategy choice but  also  on  the  processes  associated 
with  the  effective implementation  of  these  choices. This important issue  of  the 
dual  role  of  CEOs  as  strategy  formulator  and  implementor  deserves detailed 
attention.  Here,  we  want  to  focus  on  two  questions:  (1)  What  is  the  relative 
importance of  strategy formulation  versus implementation?; and (2) What  may 
explain  the  positive  association between  CEO internality  and implementation 
success? 
The Intmal CEO as Implementor 
As  far as the first question is concerned, scattered evidence throughout the litera- 
ture suggests that both management scholars and practitioners favour the issue of 
strategy formulation,  in  terms  of  both  the  content  of  and process  leading  to 
strategy choice. Much literature is  devoted to the study of the content and/or  ex 
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ante process of strategy formulation; much  less literature focuses on the ins and 
outs of  the  ex  post implementation  of  the selected strategies. On this, Lewin and 
Stephens  (1994,  p. 185)  observe  that  ‘[tlop  management’s  role  in  shaping 
strategy has been discussed in the literature . . . ,  but the CEO’s motivation and 
ability  to  shape  organization  design  as  a  means  to  imphent strategy  and  to 
match the organization design with his or her management philosophy and style 
has been largely overlooked’ (emphasis added). Similarly, Preble (1  992) observes 
that (top) managers tend to disregard strategic control. From the observation that 
several strategies may be viable in the same environment as long as managers are 
able  to  shape  coherent  configurations  in  which  strategic  choices,  structures, 
systems  and  processes  are  carefully  matched  (Miles  and  Snow,  1984; Porter, 
1980; Snow and Hrebiniak,  1980), we  hypothesize that a superior implementa- 
tion  of  a second-best strategy produces higher  organizational performance than 
an  inferior  implementation  of  the  first-best  strategy.  This  is  why  the  internal 
CEO outperforms the external CEO even if  the former is inclined to formulate a 
second-best  strategy. What  then  explains  the  internal  CEO’s  ability  to  be  a 
successful implementor? This is the second question. 
Probably,  CEO internality  is  related  to  co-alignment abilities and leadership 
style. From a contingency perspective, a CEO’s challenge is to co-align environ- 
mental contingencies with firm strategies and internal organization features, and 
to adapt this co-alignment over time in response to changing circumstances. This 
is  a complex task, requiring long-term vision  and directive behaviour. All this is 
unlikely  when  a  CEO has  no  confidence  in  her/his  ability to  influence  what 
happens to the firm. As  Lewin and Stephens argue: 
CEOs  with  internal  loci  of  control  feel  efficacious in  controlling  outcomes. 
Therefore,  they  are  likely  to  believe  in  the  concept  of  strategy,  engage  in 
strategic planning, implement the  structures and processes for monitoring the 
environment that strategic planning entails, and restructure their organizations 
to fit the  contingencies of their chosen strategies. (Lewin and Stephens,  1994, 
p.  195) 
Apart  from  designing a  co-alignment,  a  CEO has  to  take  the  lead  in  imple- 
menting the necessary changes. This requires leadership so as to mobilize subor- 
dinates. Particularly, internal CEOs exhibit the transformational leadership style 
needed here. This transformational leadership ‘[ilnspires followers to accomplish 
more difficult objectives, to approach and solve problems from new and different 
angles, and to  develop themselves to  higher  levels  of capabilities’ (Howell and 
Avolio,  1993, p. 893). Therefore, even  if  an external CEO formulates a  fitting 
strategy, such as cost leadership in the Flemish furniture industry, (s)he is unlikely 
to  design  and implement  the  overall  co-alignment  that  is  needed  to  make  a 
success of this first-best choice. 
Managmt Practice 
From  the  robust  finding that  CEO internality  facilitates organizational  perfor- 
mance, we  can underscore two issues relevant for management practice: what is 
the  implication  of  this  result  for  CEO selection  and CEO adaptation?  With 
regard  to  CEO selection, current  evidence suggests that selection committees - 
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such as boards  of advisers - could take account of the locus of  control trait  of 
candidates.  From  this  paper’s  finding  that  the  implementation  capabilities  of 
internal  CEOs may  well  overcompensate  possibly  second-best strategy choices, 
we  speculate that the selection of  an internal CEO will  hardly ever be dysfunc- 
tional. Since both validated interview and questionnaire instruments are readily 
available, assessing a  candidate’s locus of  control  score can be  done easily. As 
far  as  the  CEO adaptation  issue  is  concerned,  the  argument  is  much  more 
complicated as psychological research  has  revealed that locus of  control  seems 
to be a rather fundamental and relatively stable personality trait (Pedersen et al., 
1989). 
Given  the  observation  that  the  locus  of  control  trait  is  reluciveb - and not 
absolutely - stable,  so-called  Outward  Bound  programmes  may  facilitate  a 
CEO’s locus  of  control  shift toward  internality.  Outward  Bound  programmes 
have  the  specific  purpose  of  changing  the  self-concept,  including  locus  of 
control,  of  individuals.  Such  programmes  provide  an  environment  for  ‘[tlhe 
person  to  recognize  and  understand  his  own  weaknesses,  strengths,  and 
resources and thus  find  within  himself the  wherewithal to  master  the  difficult 
and unfamiliar’ (Richards, 1977, p. 69). Marsh et al. (1986) report that the parti- 
cipants of an Outward Bound programme became  more internal after a 26-day 
course, evaluated by means of Rotter scores collected at the first and last day of 
the  programme.  It  remains  to  be  seen,  of  course,  whether  these  short-term 
changes  are  a  manifestation of  ‘postgroup euphoria’ or whether  this  shift will 
materialize in the long run. 
Future Research 
From the above, we  conclude that this paper points to, at least, two avenues for 
future  research.  First,  the  external  validity  of  this  study’s findings needs  to  be 
investigated through replication in different industry settings. In all likelihood, the 
intermediating role  of strategy - and particularly the relative importance of the 
CEO’s role  as formulator  and implementor - differs from industry  to industry. 
Here, the well-established distinction of static and dynamic environments may be 
helpful. Since an innovative strategy is  specifically likely to contribute to organi- 
zational performance  in  dynamic  settings,  the  net  effect  of  CEO internality  is 
probably larger in industries ruled by dynamism and uncertainty  (cf. Miller and 
Toulouse,  1986b). Second, a deepening of our understanding of the CEO imple- 
mentor role as a key -  perhaps even dominant - explanation of CEO effective- 
ness  requires in-depth  studies into  the  actual contribution of  CEOs to strategy 
implementation.  To what  extent  is  the  implementation  behaviour  of  internal 
CEOs  different  from  that  of  their  external  colleagues? For  this  and  other 




Pefomnce. We used financial data from annual reports, centralized on CD-ROM by the 
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National  Bank  of  Belgium, to measure  three  performance  ratios. They are  defined as 
follows (Van Horne,  1983): 
1.  Cash flow on assets: cash flow/total assets. 
2.  Return on assets: net income/total assets. 
3.  Gross profit margin: sales less cost of goods sold/sales. 
In a follow-up questionnaire we asked the CEOs to provide a subjective evaluation of the 
overull performance of their firm  on a scale ranging from  1 (not at all satisfied) to 5 (highly 
satisfied). The question is: 
Indicate to what extent you are satisfied with  the owall performance of your company. 
CEO hcu~  of control. We used Rotter’s (1966) I-E scale to  measure locus of control. We 
enlarged the original scale with  14 filler items. Those items are indicated with  (F‘). Rotter 
items are marked with (R). (I) represents the internal alternative of every Rotter item. We 
counted the number of internal alternatives chosen by  the respondents to obtain a locus 


























Children get into trouble because their parents punish them too much. 
The problem with most children nowadays is that their parents are too easy 
with them. 
Many of the unhappy things in people’s lives are partly due to bad luck. 
People’s misfortunes result from the mistakes they make. (I) 
Heredity plays a major role in determining one’s personality. 
It is one’s experiences in life which determine what they’re like. 
One should always be willing to admit mistakes. 
It is usually best to cover up one’s mistakes. 
There are certain people who are just no good. 
There is some good in everybody. 
One of the major reasons why we  have wars is because people don’t take 
enough interest in politics. (I) 
There will always be wars, no matter how hard people try to prevent them. 
In the long run people get the respect they deserve in this world. (I) 
Unfortunately, an individual’s worth often passes unrecognized no matter 
how hard he tries. 
The idea that teachers are unfair to students is nonsense. (I) 
Most students don’t realize the extent to which their grades are influenced by 
accidental happenings. 
Without the right breaks one cannot be an effective leader. 
Capable people who fail to become leaders have not taken advantage of their 
opportunities. 0 
No matter how hard you try  some people just don’t like you. 
People who can’t get others to like them don’t understand how to get along 
with others. (I) 
People pay too much attention to body culture. 
Sports are an excellent way to build character. 
I have often found that what is going to happen will happen. 
Trusting to fate has never turned out as well for me as making a decision to 
take a definite course of action. 0 
Women don’t get to the top as easily as men because they have always been 
discriminated. 
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b 
a 
Women are not as able as men to hold leadership positions. 
In the case of a well prepared student there is rarely if ever such a thing as 
an unfair test. (I) 
Many times exam questions tend to be so unrelated to course work that 
studying is really useless. 
Children get too much homework, there isn’t enough time to play and relax. 
Most children only want to play so that it is unlikely that they will have a 
successful career. 
Sports is  no good, you only get injured. 
Sports is good for health. 
Becoming a success is a matter of hard work, luck has little or nothing to do 
with  it. (I) 
Getting a good job depends mainly on being in the right place at the right 
time. 
The average citizen can have influence in government decisions. (I) 
This world is run by  the few people in power, and there is not much the 
little guy can do about it. 
Old people can’t look out for themselves.  They should be placed in a home. 
Aged persons should have the possibility to live on their own as long as 
possible. 
When I make plans, I am almost certain that I can make them work. (I) 
It is not always wise  to plan too far ahead because many things turn out to 
be a matter of good or bad fortune anyhow. 
Violence on TV gives rise to aggressive behaviour of children. 
Violence on TV gives children the opportunity to work out their aggressive 
feelings. 
In my  case getting what I want has little or nothing to do with luck. (I) 
Many times we  might as well decide what to do by flipping a coin. 
Who gets to be the boss often depends on who was lucky enough to be in 
the right place first. 
Getting people to do the right thing depends upon ability, luck has little or 
nothing to do with it. (I) 
As far as world affairs are concerned, most of us are the victims of forces we 
can neither understand, nor control. 
By  taking an active part in political and social affairs the people can control 
world events. (I) 
Most people don’t realize the extent to which their lives are controlled by 
accidental happenings. 
There really is no such thing as ‘luck‘. (I) 
It is hard to know whether or not a person really likes you. 
How many friends you  have depends upon how nice a person you are. (I) 
One should not boast when having abilities that others do not have. 
If an individual has certain abilities, he has the right to mention it so that he 
gets the respect he deserves. 
In the long run the bad things that happen to us are balanced by the good 
ones. 
Most misfortunes are the result of lack of ability, ignorance, laziness, or all 
three. 0 
With enough effort we  can wipe out political corruption. (I) 
It is difficult for people to have much control over things politicians do in 
office. 
Sometimes I can’t understand how teachers arrive at the grades they give. 
b 
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310  a 
b 
b 
35F)  a 
b 
37N  a 
b 
There is a direct connection between how hard I study and the grades I 
Nowadays, most people pay too much attention to material things at the 
expense of their mental well-being. 
Striving for material welfare makes life more pleasant. 
Environmental pollution is the price society has to pay for achieving welfare. 
Nature cannot be protected enough, even if it costs a lot of money. 
The conditions of life in certain prisons are degrading. 
Many prisoners do not deserve a human treatment. 
Many times I feel that I have little influence over the things that happen 
to me. 
It is impossible for me to believe that chance or luck plays an important role 
in my life. 0 
People are lonely because they don’t try to be friendly. (I) 
There’s not much use in trying too hard to please people, if they like you, 
they like you. 
What happens to me is my own doing. (I) 
Sometimes I feel that I don’t have enough control over the direction my life 
is taking. 
Most of the time I can’t understand why politicians behave the way they do. 
In the long run the people are responsible for bad government on a national 
as well as on a local level. (I) 
get. 0 
Product dajirentiation. We measured three indicators of product differentiation. Respondents 
were asked to provide information on the following items: 
1.  The amount of advertising expenditures as a percentage of sales in 1989. 
2.  The number of full-time design personnel currently employed. 
3.  The number of salaried salespersons currently employed. 
We divided items 2 and 3 by the total number of employees in 1989. 
Cost  badersh$.  We  measured three indicators of cost leadership. Respondents were  asked 
to provide information on the following items: 
1.  The amount (in Bfr.) invested in CNC (computer numerical control) in  1989. 
2.  The average price charged compared with the prices of major competitors. We pro- 
vided the following seven options to the statement ‘On average, our prices are:’ 
(More  than) 10% above the average price level of our major competitors (coded as 
5% to  10% above the average price level of our major competitors (coded as 5). 
2% to 5%  above the average price level of our major competitors (coded as 4). 
Between  2% above and 2% below the average price level of our major competitors 
(coded as 3). 
2% to 5% below the average price level of our major competitors (coded as 2). 
5% to  10% below the average price level of our major competitors (coded as 1). 
(More  than) 10% below the average price level of our major competitors (coded as 
6). 
0). 
3.  The percentage of sales realized through each of the following distribution channels: 
Direct sale to final consumer. 
Small retailers. 
Large retailers (such as  IKEA). 
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Purchasing organizations. 
0  Other furniture manufacturers. 
We divided the first item by  the amount of  sales  (in Bfr.) realized in  1989. Item  3 pro- 
vided information to compute the firm’s distribution intensity (see text). 
Control variables. We used the number of employees mentioned in the annual reports as a 
measure of  organizational &e.  We  computed the acid-test, or quick, ratio from financial 
data provided in the annual reports. This ratio, defined as current assets less inventories 
divided  by  current liabilities, is  considered to  be  an accurate measure of  liquidi& (Van 
Home,  1983). Finally, tenure was  assessed by  asking the CEOs to indicate the number of 
years in  their current position. 
NOTES 
*This  project  was  financed  by  the  Belgian  National  Fund  for  Scientific  Research 
(NFWO). We gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments of Stuart Dixon and of anon- 
ymous JMS  reviewers. 
[l]  A notable exception is the study of  Powell  (1992), who analyses both the effect of 
CEO locus of  control and  generic strategy on  organizational performance. Powell 
does not, however, discuss  the relationship between locus of  control and strategic 
choice. 
[2]  In our view, the study of  Miller and Toulouse (1986a, b) is unique in presenting a 
coherent framework of the impact of CEO locus of control on firm performance by 
explicitly proposing a mediating mechanism in  the form of  different strategic pre- 
ferences between  internals and  externals. The other  studies either focus solely  on 
performance while  neglecting  strategic  choice  variables  (Begley  and  Boyd,  1987; 
Brockhaus, 1980) or only incorporate locus of control in their research design as a 
secondary concept (Powell, 1992; Van de Ven et al., 1984). 
[3]  ‘Leaders described  as  transformational  concentrate  their  efforts  on  longer  term 
goals; place value  and emphasis on developing a vision  and inspiring followers to 
pursue the vision; change or align systems to accommodate their vision  rather than 
work within  existing systems; and coach followers to take  on greater responsibility 
for  their  own development, as  well  as  the  development of  others.’  (Howell  and 
Avolio, 1993, p. 891) 
[4]  Common  method  variance  may  have  inflated  the  reported  differences between 
internal and external CEOs in past studies as these findings are, without exception, 
based on single-source self-report measures of  CEO locus of control and ‘entrepre- 
neurship’ (Boone and De Brabander, 1995). 
[5]  Cost leadership and marketing differentiation are not substantially related to perfor- 
mance (Miller and Toulouse, 1986b). 
[6]  Unfortunately, Miller and Toulouse (1986b) did not directly test whether innovation 
is  indeed a mediating variable. That is, they base their analyses on zero-order cor- 
relations. However, a formal test would imply  analysing the  relationship between 
CEO locus of  control and firm performance after controlling for innovative differ- 
entiation. 
[7]  Govindarajan (1989) assumes that the competitive strategy of SBUs is  mainly deter- 
mined at the corporate level. 
[8]  Recall that  80 per cent of  the firms in the furniture industry have fewer than  20 
employees (Febelhout, 1987). 
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[9]  One CEO even thought that we  requested information because we  wanted to start 
our own furniture firm. 
[lo]  We provide a detailed account of all  measures in the Appendix. 
[l 11  Purchasing organizations are independent furniture stores which group together to 
purchase furniture collectively from manufacturers. 
[I21  The conditional relationship or interaction  modelled in equation (3) is  symmetric. 
That is, if  the effect of  DIF on PERF depends on LOC, then the impact of  LOC 
on PERF is also dependent on DIF (Cohen, 1978). 
[13]  Southwood (1978) demonstrates that changes in the points of origin of the two main 
variables X and 5  affect all the standardized regression coefficients, including Xcs. 
The  unstundardked coefficient of  X<  however,  does  not  change  following such  a 
transformation. We  will  therefore  report  unstandardized  regression  coefficients in 
the results section (cf. Govindarajan,  1989). 
[14]  The sr equals the correlation between that portion of the independent variable (X) 
that is  uncorrelated with  the remaining independent variables (IVs) and the depen- 
dent variable (2‘).  Thus, sr2 represents the  unique contribution  of  X  to @ (Cohen 
and Cohen,  1983). Although  the partial  correlation  (i.e.  pr) contains  basically  the 
same information as the sr, there is a subtle difference. Specifically, ‘[;It  can be seen 
that  pr2 will  virtually  always  be  larger  than  and can never  be  smaller than  sr‘, 
because sr2 is  the unique contribution of X  expressed as a proportion  of the  total Y 
variance whereas pr2 expresses the same unique contribution of  X  as a proportion 
of  that part  of  the  Y  variance  not  accounted  for  by  the  other  IVs’  (Cohen and 
Cohen,  1983, p.  102). The latter  makes the  pr unsuited to  assess  whether  a vari- 
able, say 5  mediates the relationship between X  and E  Suppose, for instance, that 
5  is  not related to X, but contributes significantly to the explanation of the depen- 
dent variable  1:  In  that  case, 5  cannot  be  a  moderator  (nor a  suppressor) of  the 
relationship between  X  and  E  However, adding 5  to  an equation in which  2“ is 
regressed on X  (as in equation  (Z)),  will  generate  an increase in  the  pr associated 
with X  precisely because pr2 is  expressed as a proportion of the part of the Y  var- 
iance not accounted for by  the other IV (that is, the denominator of pr2 decreases). 
In  the present example, both  the  regression coefficient of X  and the  associated sr 
remain unchanged.  However, note  that if  one of  the coefficients is  significant (i.e. 
partial regression coefficient, sr and pr) they are all significantly different from zero 
with exactly the same t value (Cohen and Cohen, 1983). 
[15]  The value of p  decreases due to a reduction of the standard error of the regression 
coefficient of LOC from 0.044 to 0.039 (table IV). 
[16]  There is  no significant zero-order correlation between LOC and COST (r = 0.02 
with p  = 0.442; table 111). 
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